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Abstract 
This paper proposes a compositional analysis of the 
meaning of Japanese daroo-utterances with declarative 
and interrogative force, and final rising and falling 
intonation. Daroo is analyzed in a framework for speech 
act felicity as an operator lowering the quality threshold 
for felicitous assertion. The conveyed meanings of 
conjecture, confirmation, and doubt uses of daroo-
utterances are predicted from modification of the 
respective speech act types’ felicity conditions by daroo.1 
1 Preliminaries 
Speech act felicity has been widely discussed at least since Austin (1962) 
introduced the concepts of illocutionary act and illocutionary force. 
Building on Searle (1969) and Grice (1975), I provide a framework to 
formalize speech act felicity conditions and how daroo modifies them. In 
addition to declarative and interrogative force, I distinguish final falling 
and rising intonation, modeling four types of speech acts: falling 
declaratives (FDs) or canonical assertions, falling interrogatives (FIs), 
rising declaratives (RDs), and rising interrogatives (RIs) or canonical 
questions and derive their felicity conditions compositionally. 
The framework represents what a speech act “does” to the context (in 
form of commitments and forgone commitments arising from declaratives 
and interrogatives), and what needs to be the case in order for the speech 
act to do so (in form of belief and evidence conditions required to hold for 
the speech act to be performed felicitously). On this view, utterance 
meaning is a combination of the propositional level – the propositional 
content, or prejacent, that is “said” (in declaratives) or “doubted” (in 
interrogatives), and the speech act level – what the effect the act of saying 
1 The framework for speech act felicity and the basic semantics of daroo build on Rieser (2017a), 
which focuses on the particle no. In this paper, doubt and confirmation uses of daroo as well as well 
as connections to other analyses are discussed in more detail . 
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or doubting has, and what it requires to be performed. It is on the speech-
act level of utterance meaning that I assume daroo modifies utterance 
meaning, accounting for its effect in combination with the interrogative 
particle ka and the evidence particle no, both speech act operators as well. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the uses of 
daroo to be accounted for. Section 3 discusses extant generalizations and 
analyses. Section 4 introduces the framework for speech act felicity, and 
section 5 puts forward the analysis of daroo in this framework. Section 6 
provides a summary of the analysis and an outlook on future research. 
2 Uses of daroo 
In this section, I discuss three uses of daroo-utterances I label conjecture, 
doubt, and confirmation. Conjecture is the use of daroo that formal 
analyses have focused on and is limited to FDs (assertions). It conveys 
speaker bias towards the prejacent in two flavors: a guess reading and an 
evidence-based inference reading, the latter connecting daroo to evidential 
expressions in Japanese. Next, doubt is a use limited to FIs (falling 
interrogatives), which do not convey speaker bias, but that the speaker is 
either wondering about or doubting the truth of the prejacent. Finally, the 
confirmation use is limited to declaratives, and is the only use of daroo 
that can occur with final rising intonation. It conveys not only speaker bias, 
but that the speaker believes the prejacent to be true, and seeks to confirm 
whether the addressee shares this belief. The analysis seeks to account for 
all uses with a single semantics for daroo. 
2.1 Conjecture 
On its conjecture use, daroo marks the prejacent of an assertion to be 
either a general assumption (or guess) of the speaker, or the result of 
evidence-based inference. Example (1), originally proposed by Morimoto 
(1994), illustrates Takubo’s (2009) observation that the particle no is 
mandatory for the evidence-based inference reading, and that daroo 
shares this reading with the (indirect) evidential marker yooda. 
(1) Kanojo-wa moo kekkon-shita { (no) daroo / yooda }. 
She-TOP already  married-got  no daroo yooda 
“She got married already, { I bet / it seems }”. 
The scenarios in (2) bring out the two readings of daroo in conjecture use. 
(2) a. S is wondering about a former girlfriend years later.
b. S is wondering about a former girlfriend years later
and notices her name changed on the alumni newsletter.
(2-a) brings out the guess reading, as there is no concrete evidence to 
support the assumption that she has got married. (2-b) brings out the 
evidence-based inference reading, on which the speaker is inferring that 
the ex-girlfriend likely got married from the premise that her name has 
changed as the evidence in the utterance situation shows. The acceptability 
143 
Investigationes Linguisticae, vol. XLI 
of (1) in these scenarios depends on the presence or absence of no, and 
patterns with yooda ‘seem’ when no is added, as shown in (3).2 
daroo yooda nodaroo 
(3) a. no evidence ✓ # # 
b. evidence-based conjecture # ✓ ✓ 
Both variants of the daroo-assertion in (1) convey speaker bias, i.e. that 
the speaker is considering the prejacent to be more likely than its negation. 
With no is added, the utterance further conveys that this bias is the result 
of evidence-based inference. Note that neither scenario allows bare 
assertion, as there is no direct evidence for the truth of the prejacent.3 It 
should be noted that yooda shares the evidence-based inference use with 
daroo, but occurs neither in confirmations nor in expressions of doubt. 
2.2 Doubt 
(4) shows a variant of the conjecture example in (1) with the interrogative
particle ka added. Note that this makes final rising intonation unavailable.
The English paraphrase “I wonder…” illustrates an interpretation as a
potentially self-addressed question, or expression of doubt, rather than an
addressee-oriented, information-seeking question. Addition of “really”
approximates the effect of adding no, bringing out a reading on which the
speaker doubts the validity of an inference that she got married.
(4)  Kanojo-wa moo kekkon-shita (no) daroo ka { ✓↘/#↗} 
She-TOP already married-got  no daroo INT 
„I wonder if she (really) got married already.” 
Thus, this example is not information-seeking in the way that canonical 
questions (RIs) typically are, which is typical for FIs. In contrast to daroo-
declaratives, it does not convey speaker bias towards the prejacent, and, 
especially when no is added, can convey speaker bias against the prejacent. 
This is a marked contrast to bare falling interrogatives, as the one shown 
in (5) below, where adding no makes a belief-revision reading salient. 
(5)  Kanojo-wa moo kekkon-shita (no) ka ↘ 
She-TOP already married-got  no INT 
„Did she get married already!” 
This example has a doubt reading similar to the daroo-FI, but also 
readings indicating belief revision on part of the speaker. The bare variant 
has a reading on which it conveys (mild) speaker surprise over the 
(observed) truth of the prejacent, the variant with no a reading conveying 
2 Scenarios where evidence is strong enough to support the inference, but weak enough to disallow 
bare assertion can be difficult to construct, as the perceived strength of evidence varies by speaker. 
Nevertheless, contrasts observable in minimal pairs are fairly robust. 
3 Versions with epistemic modals, such as kamoshirenai ‘might’ or nichigainai ‘must’, would also 
be licit, but these operate on the propositional, rather than on the speech-act level of meaning. Due 
to space, I cannot discuss these expressions here. 
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that the speaker has revised a previous expectation against the prejacent’s 
truth, based on the available evidence.4 
The variant with daroo in (4), on the other hand, cannot convey that 
the speaker has revised a previous belief based on evidence, but only that 
the speaker (still) doubts the truth of the prejacent. That is, falling daroo-
interrogatives convey stronger doubt than bare falling interrogatives, 
particularly when no is added. Daroo-assertions on their conjecture use, 
on the other hand, convey weaker commitment than their bare 
counterparts. These are observations to be accounted for in the analysis. 
2.3 Confirmation 
(6) shows two variants of the conjecture example in (1), one with final
falling and one with final rising intonation, to illustrate the confirmation
uses of daroo. The English paraphrases, a final falling tag “isn’t she” and a
final rising tag “...right?”, reflect that the final falling variant is typically
used in a turn-holding move, while the final rising variant typically
requires a reaction from the addressee. Note the rising variant is given
with the polite form deshoo, with a shortened variant desho which is
limited to final rising environments.
(6)  Kanojo-wa kekkon-shiteiru { daroo ↘ / desho(o) ↗}
She-TOP married-be   daroo  daroo
“She’s married, {isn’t she. / right? }”.
Crucially, neither confirmation variant conveys that the speaker is biased 
towards or doubts the prejacent. Rather, the falling version confirms 
whether the prejacent is indeed accepted by both speaker and addressee, 
i.e. part of a common ground in the sense of mutually accepted
propositions, while the rising version checks whether the speaker’s
assumption that the addressee (also) believes the prejacent to be true is
correct. Thus, daroo-declaratives in confirmation use convey that the
speaker believes the prejacent to be true, but is not certain whether or not
the addressee shares this belief. This use of daroo-utterances is difficult to
capture on analyses taking daroo to be either an evidential or an
inferential marker.
3 Previous analyses 
While there is a wealth of descriptive work, mainly in Japanese, on daroo-
utterances in their various uses, there exist few formal analyses. Below, I 
selectively summarize some generalizations and extant formal analyses 
before moving on to my analysis of daroo. 
3.1 Moriyama (1992) 
Building on previous work analyzing daroo as a marker of speaker 
judgment, Moriyama takes daroo to indicate that a “judgment-forming 
4 Davis (2011) discusses this reading in detail, motivating an analysis of no as an evidential marker. 
In Rieser (2017a), I label this the „incredulity” reading. 
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process” is underway, i.e. a belief w.r.t. the prejacent is in the process of 
formation, and daroo-interrogatives 5 to indicate the speaker does not 
expect to reach such a judgment. Moriyama differentiates two kinds of 
confirmations, namely “inquiring” and “pushing” varieties. The former 
indicate that a shared belief is in the process of formation, and are used to 
inquire about the addressee’s belief. In the latter, there is a discrepancy 
between speaker and addressee belief, and the speaker seeks to convince 
the addressee of the prejacent’s truth to form a shared belief. With regard 
to intonation, Moriyama notes that confirmations come with either a 
“sudden final fall”6 or final rise. 
3.2 Hara (2006) 
Hara proposes an analysis of daroo as a modal that restricts the modal 
base to the „possible worlds which are compatible with the speaker’s non-
observable reasoning”, that is daroo lexically encodes the restriction to not 
evidence-based conjecture with a quantificational force of „more than 
50%”. My account is similar in that I take the required subjective 
likelihood of the prejacent, and thus the quantificational force of daroo, to 
be more than 50%. However, I take quantification to occur over all 
doxastically accessible worlds and daroo to be a speech-act level operator, 
which is closer in spirit to Hara and Davis (2013), summarized below. 
3.3 Takubo (2009) 
Takubo seeks to explain his observation that no makes daroo-assertions 
felicitous in scenarios with evidence by analyzing daroo as an epistemic 
modal marking deductive inference, which no allows to mark abductive 
inference by scope-widening. This means that daroo marks modus ponens 
inference by which a conditional consequent is judged true on the premise 
that the antecedent holds, and that adding no allows inference in the other 
direction, namely that a conditional antecedent is true on the premise that 
the consequent holds. Applied to (1), this means that no-daroo indicates 
the speaker is inferring from the premises that the name changed and that 
when women get married, they usually change their names that her having 
married is a likely explanation for her name having changed. While this 
analysis accounts for the facts on daroo-conjectures, there does not seem 
to be a straightforward way of applying it to confirmations. 
3.4 Hara and Davis (2013) 
Hara and Davis propose that speaker bias in daroo-assertions is a result of 
update on speaker belief rather than on mutually accepted propositions. 
Following Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009), they model a context set 
from pairs of equivalent worlds. Declarative update eliminates pairs 
containing worlds at which the prejacent is false, while inquisitive update 
5 Moriyama discusses daroo utterances with wh-expressions as examples for interrogatives rather 
than daroo-ka utterances as discussed in this paper. 
6 In such cases, the final vowel can be shortened to yield “. . . daro↓” 
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partitions the context to contain pairs where the prejacent is true at one 
world, false at the other. Daroo modifies the modal base so that update 
targets doxastically accessible worlds, i.e. worlds that are compatible with 
the speaker’s beliefs.  
H&D assume that final rising intonation shifts the “deictic center” of 
daroo (the agent of updated beliefs) to the addressee and hypothesize that 
when the overt force marker ka intervenes between the final rise and 
daroo, this shifting is blocked. This explains the marginal status of rising 
daroo-ka utterances thus predicted to convey “do you know whether I 
believe [the prejacent]”, a meaning only compatible with quiz questions.7 
The infelicity of bare daroo-conjecture with evidence is explained by 
lexical specification of different types of evidence within Davis et al.’s 
(2007) context-shifting semantics, where a contextual parameter Cτ 
determines the subjective probability required for felicitous assertion, 
reflecting the first Gricean maxim of quality. H&D argue that yooda 
requires ‘indirect’ evidence, while daroo accepts ‘all evidence’, and that 
utterance felicity depends on evidence of the required type and on 
subjective probability clearing the corresponding threshold Cτ. Thus, 
daroo and yooda indirectly change the required subjective probability Cτ 
by lowering the threshold in a process labeled “context shifting”. Hara and 
Davis leave the effect of no assimilating daroo to yooda as an open issue, 
mentioning the possibility of analyzing no as a question particle. 
4 A framework for speech-act felicity 
In this section, I formalize the felicity conditions of the aforementioned 
four speech act types in terms of belief and evidence, building on Gricean 
conversational maxims and the Searlean preparatory condition on 
interrogatives. I compositionally derive each type’s felicity conditions from 
illocutionary force and sentence-final intonation. I first show how speaker 
commitment arises from satisfaction of the belief and evidence conditions 
on declaratives. Moving on to interrogatives, which do not make but forgo 
commitments, I show that they give rise to implicatures derived as 
negation of the respective declarative alternative’s commitment. Finally, I 
show sentence-final intonation to resolve the target of commitment to the 
speaker (final fall) or the addressee (final rise).  
4.1 Gricean Quality and commitment from assertion 
Grice (1975) formulates two specific maxims based on the supermaxim of 
quality for assertions “Try to make your contribution one that is true”. 
Quality I Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Quality II Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
7 Searle (1969) differentiates „exam questions” from „real questions”, as in the former the speaker 
knows the answer and wants to find out whether the addressee does, too, while in the latter the 
speaker does not know the answer. This is an interesting connection with potential implications for 
the current proposal, which for space I have to leave for further research. 
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I take these maxims to be conditions on felicitous utterance of an assertion 
which require the world at utterance time to be such that the prejacent is 
compatible with the speaker’s beliefs, and there is evidence available to the 
speaker which, considered in isolation, is sufficient to conclude that, i.e. 
support a belief that, the prejacent is true.8 These conditions are shown in 
(7) and (8) below (BS φ and EVS φ are to be defined shortly).
(7) Evidence condition on DECS(φ)↘ (Quality I): EVS φ
(8) Belief condition on DECS(φ)↘  (Quality II): ¬BS¬φDECS(φ)↘ represents a falling declarative utterance of agent S (speaker) 
with prejacent φ, that is assertion of φ by S. Note that I closely follow 
Grice’s formulation of Quality II and do not assume a condition BSφ, that is 
a requirement that the speaker believe the prejacent to be true.9 
(9) and (10) show definitions of non-negated and negated belief in
terms of doxastic states. DOXS denotes the set of worlds compatible with S’s 
beliefs, i.e. the doxastic state of the speaker.10 
(9) BS φ is true iff DOXS ⊆ Wφ
(10) ¬ BS φ is true iff DOXS ⊈ Wφ 
(where Wφ denotes the set of worlds at which φ is true.)11 
When an assertion is observed and assumed to be felicitous in that (7) and 
(8) are satisfied, it can be inferred that the speaker believes the prejacent
to be true, all else being equal. The defeasible entailment12 relation in (11)
accordingly defines the relation of belief and evidence, thus indirectly
defining evidence by its relation to belief.
(11) a.  EVS φ > BS φ
b. [ (EVS φ > BS φ) ∧ EVS φ ] ∧ BS ¬φ ⊬ BS φ
c. [ (EVS φ > BS φ) ∧ EVS φ ] ∧ ¬BS ¬φ ⊢ BS φ
According to (11a), it can usually be inferred that S believes φ to be true 
when the evidence condition on DECS(φ)↘ is satisfied. (11b) states BS¬φ as 
the blocking condition, i.e. the inference is defeated when the observer 
assumes the speaker to believe the prejacent to be false. (11c) shows that 
satisfaction of the belief condition on DECS(φ)↘ ensures that the inference 
goes through, thus speaker commitment arises from assertion. 
Since a speech act is a “manifest event” (Stalnaker 2002), I further 
assume commitment takes the form of a public belief PBS φ, which holds 
when BS φ is inferred from DECS(φ)↘, as in (12), and is defined in (13). 
(12) Commitment from DECS(φ) ↘ : PB Sφ
(13) PBS φ ⟷ BA BS φ ∧ BS BA BS φ
8 This builds on Büring and Gunlogson’s (2000) definition of „compelling” evidence. 
9 Against Searle (1969), who proposes such a sincerity condition for assertions. 
10 For simplicity, I gloss over the potential necessity of restricting these worlds by an additional 
conversational background such as a stereotypical ordering source (Kratzer 1981). 
11 BS φ is equivalent to a speaker belief □φ ; hence ¬BS φ to speaker¬□φ and ◇¬φ. 
12 Defeasible entailment written as > is based on Asher and Lascarides (2003). 
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When A observes S’s assertion of φ and assumes S to be cooperative, i.e. 
that the conditions on felicitous assertion are satisfied, BABS φ follows 
from the inference rules in (11). When S in turn assumes that A judged the 
assertion felicitous, BSBABS φ follows.13 In this way, a public belief PBS φ 
arises from assertion of φ by S and assumed cooperativity, i.e. satisfaction 
of the belief and evidence conditions representing Gricean quality. 
4.2 Gricean Quality in interrogatives 
I propose that interrogatives come with a single preparatory condition 
¬BSφ, roughly corresponding to Searle’s (1969) preparatory condition for 
questions that the speaker not know the answer. 
(14) Belief condition on INTS(φ): ¬BSφ
Note that this condition on INTS(φ) holds regardless of falling or rising 
intonation, i.e. it goes for both FIs and RIs (questions). An according 
Gricean-inspired maxim for interrogatives could go as follows. 
Quality Int Do not doubt what you believe to be true. 
In addition to this, the meaning of interrogative utterances is enriched by 
implicatures from forgoing their declarative alternatives. Choosing an 
interrogative over a declarative gives rise to what Geurts (2010) calls a Q-
implicature, from the first Gricean maxim of quantity “Make your 
contribution as informative as required […]” (Grice 1975). In the case of an 
FI, the Q-implicature is that the speaker does not entertain the belief that 
the forgone FD (assertion) makes public, thus INTS(φ)↘ gives rise to the 
implicature ¬PBS φ, the negation of PB Sφ from DECS(φ)↘, as shown below. 
(15) Forgone commitment from INTS(φ) ↘ : ¬PB Sφ
(16) ¬PBS φ ⟷ BA ¬BS φ ∧ BS BA ¬BS φ
In short, when commitment to φ is forgone, an observer can assume that the 
speaker does not believe φ to be true. 
4.3 Commitment in rising utterances 
Building on Gunlogson (2003) and its adaptation for Japanese particle 
utterances in Davis (2011), I assume final rising intonation in declaratives 
resolves a variable to the addressee, final falling intonation to the 
speaker.14 (17) and (18) show prosodically underspecified evidence and 
belief conditions on declaratives. 
(17)  Evidence condition on DECS(φ): EVS Bx φ 
(18) Belief condition on DECS(φ): BS ¬Bx ¬φ 
(where ↗ resolves x to A, ↘ resolves x to S) 
13 The definition uses a simplified model with only two participants: S and A, and glosses over the 
fact that commitment by a manifest event gives rise to an in principle infinite number of higher 
order beliefs, cf. the definition of mutual introspection in Rieser (2017b).  
14 Differing from Gunlogson and Davis, I assume the variable in the belief and evidence conditions 
rather than in commitments as [ (EVS Bx φ > BS Bxφ)∧EVS Bxφ ]∧B S¬Bx ¬φ ⊢ BS Bx φ, thus PBS Bx φ 
arises from DECS(φ). 
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A final rise resolves the evidence and belief conditions as in (19) and (20)15. 
(19) Evidence condition on DECS(φ)↗: EVS BAφ
(20) Belief condition on DECS(φ)↗:  B S¬BA ¬φ 
Applying the inference rule as in (21) predicts RD commitment as in (22). 
(21) [ (EVS BA φ > BS BAφ) ∧ EVS BAφ ] ∧ B S¬BA ¬φ ⊢ BS BA φ
(22) Commitment from DECS(φ)↗:  PB S BA φ
The question of whether or not bare RDs exist in Japanese set aside16, 
commitment to a higher-order belief that the addressee beliefs the 
prejacent to be true is compatible with the observation that daroo-RDs 
convey speaker assumptions w.r.t. addressee belief, cf. section 5.3. 
Turning to RIs (questions), I assume they have the standard 
interrogative preparatory condition shown in (23) that the speaker not 
believe the prejacent to be true. When the question is chosen over the 
declarative alternative (the RD), forgone commitment as in (24) arises. 
(23) Belief condition on INTS(φ)↗ (Quality Int):  ¬BSφ
(24) Forgone commitment from INTS(φ)↗: ¬PBSBA φ
Taken together, this accounts for the intuition that questions, while 
potentially conveying speaker bias towards or against the prejacent, are in 
principle neutral w.r.t. the addressee’s beliefs, and are not felicitous when 
the speaker already knows (or believes to know) the answer. 
5 Daroo lowers the quality threshold 
I propose that daroo lowers the quality threshold, weakening the speaker 
commitment that arises from felicitous assertion. As commitment is 
defined in terms of public speaker belief, this requires a definition of 
weaker commitment in terms of weaker speaker belief BdarooS φ as defined 
in (26), shown along with the unmodified belief proposition in (25).  
(25) BS φ is true iff DOXS ⊆ Wφ 
(26) BdarooS φ is true iff | DOXS∩Wφ| > | DOXS∩W¬φ|
(where W¬φdenotes the set of worlds at which φ is false.) (26) states that BdarooS φ holds iff there are more accessible worlds at which φ
is true than accessible worlds at which φ is false. This means that the speaker
considers φ more likely than ¬φ, or that the subjective probability of φ is
more than 50%17, which in turn has the consequence of a weaker evidence
condition given the way that evidence and commitment are connected on
the present proposal.
15 (20) is essentially the mirrored version of the belief condition on assertion requiring the speaker 
to not belief what is asserted to be false. A Grice-inspired maxim for RDs could thus be “do not 
commit the addressee to what you assume they believe to be false” 
16 Polar RDs and Ris (questions) are not syntactically differentiated in Japanese. 
17 For discussion of issues with the formal implementation of (gradable) likelihood see for instance 
Lassiter (2011). The likelihood that daroo encodes is, however, not gradable, thus porentially easier 
to capture. 
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5.1 The quality threshold and conjecture 
The lowered quality threshold directly accounts for weaker commitment 
from daroo-assertion, written as PBdaroo S φ, the weaker variant of PBS φ. 
(27) Commitment from DECS(φ daroo)↘ : PBdaroo S φ
(28) PBdarooS φ ⟷ BABdarooS φ ∧ BSBABdarooS φ
PBdarooS φ is commitment from (daroo-)assertion and thus the result of 
addressee reasoning on manifest linguistic behavior. The evidence 
condition is also weakened to EVdarooS φ, as “adequate evidence” (following 
Grice’s formulation) for weaker commitment is lesser evidence than that 
required for full commitment. 
(29) Evidence condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↘: EVdarooS φ
(30) Belief condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↘: ¬BS ¬φ 
The required strength of evidence thus depends on the respective speech 
act’s quality threshold, represented as EVA and BA in the speech-act 
relative defeasible inference rules below, where A stands for a speech-act 
type, here bare utterances and such with daroo. 
(31) EVA φ > BA φ
(32) [ (EVA φ > BA φ) ∧ EVdarooS φ ] ∧ ¬BS ¬φ ⊢ BdarooS φ
Thus, PBdarooS φ arises from daroo assertions like (33) repeated from (1). 
(33) Kanojo-wa moo kekkon-shita (no) daroo.↘ 
She-TOP already  married-got no daroo 
  “She got married already, I bet”. 
The conveyed meaning of (33) without no is paraphrased in (34). 
(34) S does not believe that she hasn’t got married and has evidence
supporting the assumption that she more likely got married than not,
hence S commits to a belief that she more likely got married.
This is compatible with the guess reading of daroo-conjecture. As for no, I 
take it to add the following evidence condition18, where X represents all 
participants (A and S in the simplified model). 
(38) Evidence condition added by no: EVX φ
(39) shows an according paraphrase of the no-daroo variant of (33).
(39) S does not believe that she hasn’t got married and there is
evidence available to all participants supporting the assumption that
she more likely got married than not, hence S commits to a belief that
she more likely got married.
18 See Rieser (2017b) for a more detailed analysis of the contribution of no, including utterances 
without daroo. Davis (2011) also proposes an analysis of no as an evidential marker based on the 
effect of no on the conveyed meaning of falling interrogatives. 
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Clearly, in the scenario with evidence, it is preferable to add no, marking 
that the grounds for committing to the prejacent are publicly available 
evidence. The difference between the variant with and the that without no 
thus comes down to “guessing” based on evidence only available to the 
speaker, and making an inference based on publicly available evidence. 
The badness of the plain daroo-assertion in the evidence scenario is thus 
not encoded in the meaning of daroo, but arises from the availability of an 
alternative marking of such evidence with no19. 
5.2 The quality threshold in interrogatives 
The marked difference between the uses of FIs with and without daroo is 
in line with the conveyed meanings predicted by the present proposal. 
First, note that bare and daroo FIs do not differ in preparatory conditions, 
but only in forgone commitment arising as an implicature. 
(40) Belief condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↘: ¬BSφ 
(41) Forgone commitment from INTS(φ daroo) ↘ :  ¬PBdaroo S φ
The definition of ¬PBdarooS φ is given in (42) parallel to that of ¬PBS φ in (16). 
(42) ¬PBdarooS φ ⟷ BA ¬BdarooS φ ∧ BS BA ¬BdarooS φ
Next, the definition of negated belief under a lowered quality threshold is 
shown in (44) along with the non-negated version (43) repeated from (26). 
(43) BdarooS φ is true iff | DOXS∩Wφ| > | DOXS∩W¬φ|
(44) ¬ BdarooS φ is true iff | DOXS∩Wφ| ≤ | DOXS∩W¬φ|
There is a crucial difference between negated and non-negated daroo-
belief – the former allows the speaker to be neutral w.r.t. to the prejacent 
(i.e. the cardinality of accessible φ-worlds is the same as that of accessible 
¬φ worlds), while the latter excludes this case. Thus, negated daroo-belief 
means that the speaker is either neutral with regard to the prejacent, or 
biased against it, straightforwardly explaining the lack of speaker bias 
from daroo-FIs. Our example is repeated in (45) from (4). 
(45) Kanojo-wa moo kekkon-shita (no) daroo ka  {✓↘/#↗}
She-TOP already married-got  no  daroo INT 
„I wonder if she (really) got married already.” 
The paraphrase of the daroo-FI without no goes as follows. 
(46) S does not believe that she got married, and (even) forgoes to
commit to a belief that she likely got married.
This accounts for the observation that daroo-FIs convey stronger doubt 
than plain ones, as indicated by insertion of “even” in the paraphrase: 
forgoing to fully commit to the prejacent (¬PBS φ from the plain FI) 
19 This is potentially a case of maximize presupposition, but can also be a Q-implicature from the 
plain version that there is no mutually accessible evidence, assuming that perceptual evidence 
activates the alternative with no. 
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constrains admissible doxastic states less than “even” forgoing to weakly 
commit to the prejacent (¬PBdarooS φ from the daroo-FI). 
Consider next the paraphrase of the no-daroo-FI (45) given in (47). 
(47) S does not believe that she got married, there is evidence available
to all participants that she more likely got married, but S (even)
forgoes to commit to a belief that she likely got married.
The addition of no brings out stronger doubt, making it plausible that 
previously held negative bias prevents φ from (even weakly) committing to 
the prejacent, so that defeasible inference is blocked as in (48). 
(48) [ (EVA φ > BA φ) ∧ EVdarooS φ ] ∧ BdarooS ¬φ ⊬ BdarooS φ
This is in line with the observation that no-daroo-FIs convey that publicly 
available evidence is not sufficient to change the polarity of speaker bias, 
and explains that a belief revision reading is only available in no-FIs 
without daroo lowering the quality threshold. 
5.3 The quality threshold in rising utterances 
I propose that in rising utterances, daroo has the same effect of lowering 
the quality threshold as in falling utterances. According evidence and 
belief conditions on daroo-RDs are as follows. 
(49) Evidence condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↗:  EVdarooS BAφ
(50) Belief condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↗: B S¬BA ¬φ 
This gives rise to weaker speaker commitment w.r.t. addressee belief. 
(51) Commitment from DECS(φ daroo) ↗: PBdaroo S BA φ 
While in line with H&D’s analysis that daroo shifts the deictic center to the 
addressee 20 , my analysis differs in that daroo-RDs do not update 
addressee beliefs, but convey speaker assumptions w.r.t. addressee belief. 
 Also in line with H&D, I take rising daroo-utterances to be RDs, pace 
Sudo (2013) who takes them to be polar questions with a question particle 
desho. Sudo observes that final rising desho-utterances  “carry  strong 
[…] epistemic bias, but no evidential bias”, that is they are felicitous 
regardless of contextual evidence w.r.t the prejacent, and convey that the 
speaker is biased towards the prejacent. Both of these properties are 
atypical of Japanese polar questions which are generally sensitive to 
contextual evidence and give rise to epistemic bias of opposite polarity to 
that of the prejacent. Hence, the bias patterns of rising daroo-utterances 
suggest they are RDs. The relevant example is repeated as (52) from (6). 
(52) Kanojo-wa kekkon-shiteiru desho(o). ↗
She-TOP married-be  daroo
“She’s married, right?”
The meaning of (52) is predicted to be as paraphrased in (53). 
20 With the caveat that I do not assume deictic shifting to only occur in daroo-utterances. 
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(53) S does not believe that A believes she is still unmarried and has
evidence that A more likely believes that she got married than not,
hence commits to a belief that A more likely believes she got married.
This paraphrase accounts for the observation that daroo-RDs are used to 
confirm a speaker assumption about addressee belief, and corresponds to 
Moriyama’s (1992) “inquiring” confirmations.  
It remains to account for the marginal status of questions (RIs) with 
daroo. While H&Ds suggestion that overt force marking blocks deictic 
shifting is a possible explanation, I suggest that there might be a more 
simple reason. Rising daroo-utterances are CG-maximizing as they, 
according to Sudo (2013) necessarily, convey the speaker is committed to 
the prejacent, and confirm whether the addressee is, too. Deriving an 
interrogative by adding ka, however, does not only give rise to forgone 
commitment, but also comes with the interrogative belief condition. 
(54) Belief condition on INTS(φ daroo) ↗: ¬BSφ 
(55) Forgone commitment from INTS(φ daroo) ↗:  ¬PBdaroo S BA φ
(54) obviously clashes with the prerequisite for a CG-maximizing reading
that the speaker be committed to the prejacent, which explains the
infelicity of daroo-questions as confirmations. When, on the other hand,
the communicative intention is not CG-maximizing, Japanese offers a
variety of polar questions to convey different constellations of epistemic
and evidential bias while inquiring about the prejacent.
H&D’s observation that daroo-questions can be used in “quiz 
questions” (even though their example is of a wh-question and thus not 
directly comparable to the scope of data discussed here) can be explained 
as a marginal form of confirmation, where epistemic bias is to be avoided, 
in the quiz or exam case most likely in order not to reveal the correct 
answer, which the asker naturally knows. 
5.4 Accounting for confirmations 
Hara and Davis (2013) follow Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009), 
assuming that assertive update excludes (pairs of) worlds from a context 
set. I suggest that this is not necessarily the case, but that only worlds at 
which the speaker does not believe the prejacent to be true are eliminated 
by addition of public beliefs to the context set21. Whether or not this leads 
to an update of the shared public beliefs of the participants, or CG update, 
depends on whether or not the addressee goes on to commit to the 
prejacent as well. 
This is not to say, however, that there are no cases in which addition of 
a proposition to the common ground is a desired effect of assertion. I 
propose that confirming daroo-assertions are straightforwardly accounted 
for under the assumption that they (along with rising daroo-declaratives 
21 In Rieser (2017a), I propose a radically simplified view of context: a context is the same as a 
world; the world at utterance time being what utterances alter, in the case of assertions by adding 
(public) belief propositions. 
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discussed above) are conventionally CG-maximizing utterances. As such, 
they commit the speaker to a public belief that the prejacent is a shared 
belief, as shown in (56). 
(56) Commitment from CG-maximizing assertion: PBS (BS φ ∧ BA φ)
When commitment is weakened by daroo’s lowering of the quality 
threshold, the following preparatory conditions apply, where ↓ represents 
Moriyamas “abrupt final fall” to differentiate confirmations from the 
conjecture use of daroo-assertions.22 
(57) Evidence condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↓: EVdarooS (BS φ ∧ BA φ)
(58) belief condition on DECS(φ daroo) ↓: ¬BS¬ (BS φ ∧ BA φ) 
The example of a falling daroo-confirmation is repeated in (59) from (6), 
with final intonation modified to ↓. 
(59) Kanojo-wa kekkon-shiteiru  daroo. ↓
She-TOP married-be   daroo
“She’s married, isn’t she.”
On the present analysis, the meaning of (59) can be paraphrased as in (60). 
(60) S does not believe that it’s not a shared belief that she’s married
and has evidence that it is likely a shared belief, hence commits to a
belief that “she is married” is likely a shared belief.
If the speaker is already committed to the prejacent (which is particularly 
reasonable in the case of “pushing” confirmations in Moriyama’s 
classification), weak speaker commitment to the prejacent being a shared 
belief entails weak speaker commitment to the prejacent being a belief of 
the addressee. Hence, (59) receives an interpretation parallel to that of 
daroo-RDs in terms of what is conveyed about the speaker’s assumptions 
w.r.t. addressee belief.
The difference between rising and falling daroo-confirmations thus is 
that between “inquiring” and “pushing” variants: daroo-RDs make direct 
reference to addressee belief but not to shared belief, resulting in the 
inquiring confirmation reading. Confirming daroo-assertions, on the other 
hand, skip the addressee’s confirmation, thus jumping to the conclusion, 
so to speak, that the prejacent is more likely a shared belief than not, 
giving rise to the pushing confirmation reading. 
6 Conclusion and outlook 
I have proposed an analysis of daroo as a speech act modifier lowering the 
quality threshold, thereby weakening speaker commitment so that lesser 
evidence is sufficient for felicitous assertion. I have shown that this unified 
22 The existence of the specialized forms desho↗ and daro↓ is circumstantial evidence for their 
marked status as conventionally CG-maximing utterances, but requires further investigation. I do 
not claim that daroo-assertions with a regular final fall can not be used as confirmations, but that 
the abrupt final fall disambiguates towards a (CG-maximizing) confirmation reading. 
155 
Investigationes Linguisticae, vol. XLI 
semantics makes predictions on the conveyed meaning of daroo-
utterances which are compatible with the observations in the literature. 
The analysis accounts not only for conjecture and doubt uses, but also for 
confirmation uses, which is an advantage over analyses on which daroo 
requires specific types of evidence, such as Hara and Davis (2013), and 
analyses assuming it marks specific types of inference, such as Takubo 
(2009), neither of which are obviously applicable to confirmations. Not 
considering the indirect evidential yooda to be an expression of the same 
class as daroo has the additional advantage of explaining why yooda has 
neither doubt- nor confirmation uses. Furthermore, the framework for 
speech act felicity used for the analysis is independently motivated as it is 
based on widely accepted Gricean conversational maxims and 
compositionally accounts for differences in the felicity conditions of four 
utterance types differentiated by force and prosody. 
Regarding possible expansion of the analysis beyond daroo, it is 
necessary to account for other expressions of (subjective) probability or 
likelihood, such as epistemic modals and modal adverbs, and for evidential 
expressions needs, on either the propositional or on the speech-act level of 
utterance meaning in the proposed framework. Expanding the scope of the 
analysis to Japanese sentence-final expressions which make reference to 
speaker and addressee belief is a particularly interesting perspective. For 
instance, there is functional overlap of daroo in confirmation use and 
Japanese sentence-final expressions such as outer negation in falling polar 
interrogatives (dewanai-ka, also occurring in contracted forms like janai-
ka and jan) as well as sentence-final particles (concretely the particle 
combination yo-ne), suggesting these expressions as suitable starting 
points for further research. 
In order to test the cross-linguistic validity of the framework in 
general and the proposed analysis in particular, application to languages 
other than Japanese is a promising perspective. There are, for instance, 
interesting parallels between the functions of daroo and that of the 
German particle wohl, as already mentioned by Hara (2006), who applies 
tests Zimmermann (2004) proposes for determining the scope of German 
wohl to daroo. While wohl in isolation closely resembles daroo in 
conjecture and doubt uses, the particle combination doch wohl has a 
confirmation use similar to the “pushing” variety of daroo-confirmations, 
as discussed in Rieser (2013). 
Finally, what strategies languages without a comparably rich 
inventory of speech-act level operators, such as English, employ to realize 
the communicative functions that daroo-utterances cover in Japanese is 
an intriguing question for further research complementing the expansion 
of the analysis to languages that have similar expressions 
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